時論廣場》冒進的外交作爲 收益小風險大（方恩格 Ross Darrell Feingold）
英國《金融時報》報導，蔡英文總統30日將在美國紐約一場華府智庫活動演講，並接受頒發「全球領導力獎」。圖爲2015年時任民進黨主席的蔡英文（右）在華盛頓演講。（本報資料照片）
臺灣外交最近有很多好消息。外交部長吳釗燮訪問位於華盛頓特區外的美國在臺協會總部、蔡英文總統即將過境美國，以及她會見衆議院議長麥卡錫，都使蔡政府得以宣稱在外交政策上取得勝利。韓國空軍飛機再次在高雄補充燃料，以及韓國外交部長呼籲維持臺灣海峽現狀的聲明都令蔡政府愉悅，即使這些動作並非是韓國對於中共攻擊臺灣時會對臺援助的承諾。且在最近幾周，美國和日本首次在日本舉行「鐵拳」軍演，進一步證明日本在防衛問題上越來越認真。
然而，在2023年的前兩個月，臺灣的外交也遭遇挫折，可見臺灣的外交政策風險也很大。
一、在非洲：2020年，臺灣成爲少數幾個在未被國際承認但自治的索馬利蘭開設代表處的國家之一，隨後進行了援助和雙邊正式訪問。有些臺灣人一廂情願的稱這種關係爲「準邦交」，且蔡總統還稱臺灣與索馬利蘭爲「共享民主自由的價值，是理念相近的夥伴」。然而，阿卜迪總統推遲了去年的選舉並延長了任期，而數百人便在隨後的動盪中喪生。另外，儘管史瓦帝尼國王去年10月對臺灣進行了國是訪問，但據中央社報導，史瓦帝尼總理上週也對臺灣進行了國是訪問。6個月內兩次對臺訪問的同時，史瓦帝尼國內發生了反對國王絕對君主制的抗議，及今年年初一名親民主活動人士被謀殺的事件。臺灣很有可能因爲支持非洲兩個武力鎮壓政府而被指控爲不民主行徑。
二、太平洋島國：2月7日，所羅門羣島馬萊塔省省長蘇達尼在省議會投票中被逼下臺。蘇達尼直言不諱地批評總理蘇嘉瓦瑞在2019年決定與中華民國斷交而與中華人民共和國建交，並鼓吹馬萊塔宣佈獨立（如果發生這種情況，可能會使馬萊塔與中華民國建交）。臺灣政府在2021年爲身患重病的蘇達尼提供醫療服務，導致了他與總理的關係惡化。最近有消息稱，密克羅尼西亞與臺灣討論了建交的可能性，以換取臺灣提供的大量金援。但也許臺灣應該把在太平洋抗中的任務留給大國澳大利亞和美國。
三、東協：2月21日，新加坡外交部長維文在北京會見國臺辦主任宋濤，維文在臉書貼文上稱其爲老朋友，以及據新加坡外交部稱，維文重申了新加坡的「一中政策」。2月27日，維文在新加坡國會表示，新加坡不希望被迫在中國和美國之間選邊站。在此之前，東協外長於2月4日發表聲明稱，「東協會在促進臺灣海峽各方之間的和平對話時發揮建設性作用」。雖然臺灣外交部發表聲明對東協外長表示感激，但事實上東協國家在臺灣問題上的立場十分明確，即使臺灣有「新南向政策」也沒有改變這一點。
四、烏克蘭：2月24日中國發表《中方關於政治解決烏克蘭危機的立場》。美國某學者警告說，該提議與結束烏克蘭戰爭無關，反而是與中國爲了設定贏得對臺戰爭的條件有關。不過，烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基積極迴應，表示希望與習近平會面，商討這一提議。儘管臺灣曾援助烏克蘭並頻繁聲明臺灣與烏克蘭站在一起，烏克蘭仍很有可能選擇與中國維持關係而非與臺灣發展關係。
五、尼加拉瓜：3月2日，「尼加拉瓜人權專家組織」向聯合國人權理事會提交的報告認定，尼加拉瓜警察和親政府團體在2018年4至9月期間的反政府抗議活動中犯下了危害人類罪。在此期間，臺灣與尼加拉瓜尚有邦交，而尼加拉瓜陸軍總司令阿維萊斯上將還在2018年的3月拜訪了蔡英文總統，他後來因涉及侵害人權而被美國製裁。除此之外，2018 年臺灣向尼國警長迪亞茲捐贈了數百萬美元（據稱用於醫療援助）。不幸的是，臺灣在此期間仍繼續支持尼加拉瓜政府。
筆者經常指出，臺灣的外交目的不可能一蹴而就。換句話說，其他國家將臺灣視爲一個正常國家對待，而不是一個值得特殊對待的國家。偶爾，臺灣與另一個受到威脅的國家「站在一起」，或者說臺灣與其他國家共享自由民主價值有時是有用的。但最終其他國家還是會優先考慮自己的利益，更多時候是利用臺灣。最近的事件再次證明了這一點，並提醒，臺灣的安全取決於與美國的關係，且冒進的外交作爲，其收穫是有限的。
（作者爲美國共和黨前亞太區主席，許淳恩譯）
原文：
Foreign Policy Springs Forward, Falls Back
By Ross Darrell Feingold
Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad
Twitter: @RossFeingold
There’s plenty of recent good news for Taiwan’s foreign policy. Foreign Minister Joseph Wu’s visit to the American Institute in Taiwan’s headquarters outside Washington DC, President Tsai’s upcoming transit of the United States (consistent with past transits), and her meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (even if it is in the United States and not Taipei) will allow the Tsai Administration to claim foreign policy victories. South Korea’s air force planes again refueling in Kaohsiung and statements by Korea’s foreign minister calling for the status quo to be maintained in the Taiwan Strait are welcome, even if it is not a commitment by South Korea to come to Taiwan’s aid if China attacks. Also in recent weeks, the United States and Japan are for the first time holding the Iron Fist military exercise in Japan, further proof that that Japan is becoming more serious about defense issues.
However, in the first two months of 2023, Taiwan’s foreign policy has also experienced setbacks, which shows how risky foreign policy initiatives can be for Taiwan.
1. Africa: In 2020 Taiwan became one of the few countries to open a representative office in the unrecognized but self-governing Somaliland, with aid and bilateral official visits following afterwards. Some in Taiwan foolishly call the relationship “diplomatic recognition in waiting”（準邦交）and President Tsai called Taiwan and Somaliland “like-minded partners who share the values of democracy and freedom”. However, President Muse Bihi Abdi'delayed last year’s election and extended his term in office, and hundreds have died in subsequent unrest. Separately, even though Eswatini’s King made a state visit to Taiwan last October, the Central News Agency reported that Eswatini’s Prime Minister made a “state visit” to Taiwan last week. Two state visits to Taiwan within six months comes amid protests against the King’s absolute monarchy and the murder earlier this year of a pro-democracy activist. There is a significant risk that Taiwan will be accused of supporting two repressive governments in Africa.
2. Pacific Island Countries: On February 7 Daniel Suidani, the Premier of Malaita Province was ousted in a provincial assembly vote. Suidani is an outspoken critic of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s decision in 2019 to derecognize the Republic of China and to recognize the People’s Republic of China, and advocated for Malaita to declare independence (which if it occurred, would have likely resulted in Malaita established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China). The Taiwan government provided medical care to Suidani in 2021 when he was suffering from a serious illness, which worsened his relationship with the prime minister. More recently is news that Federated States of Micronesia and Taiwan discussed the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations in return for a large aid pack provided by Taiwan. Perhaps Taiwan should leave countering China in the Pacific to the major powers, Australia and the United States.
3. ASEAN: On February 21, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan met in Beijing with Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao whom Balakrishnan called his old friend in a Facebook post (a rare meeting between the Taiwan Affairs Office Director and a foreign minister), and according to Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Balakrishnan reaffirmed Singapore’s “One China” policy. On February 27 in a speech at Singapore’s Parliament, Balakrishnan said Singapore does not wish to be forced to choose sides between China and the United States. Balakrishnan’s statements about Taiwan followed a February 4 ASEAN Foreign Ministers statement that “ASEAN stands ready to play a constructive role in facilitating peaceful dialogue between all parties” in the Taiwan Strait. Although Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its own statement expressing its appreciation for the ASEAN foreign ministers, the reality is ASEAN countries position on Taiwan is quite clear, and the “New Southbound Policy” has not changed this.
4. Ukraine: On February 24, China published “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. Experts warned that the proposal has little to do with ending the war in Ukraine and everything to do with setting the conditions to win a future war over Taiwan. However, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky responded positively, and said he plans to meet Xi Jinping to discuss the proposal. There is a risk that Taiwan’s aid to Ukraine, and frequent statements that Taiwan stands with Ukraine, will still result in Ukraine maintaining a relationship with China and not developing one with Taiwan.
5. Nicaragua: On March 2, a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council authored by the “Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua” determined that crimes against humanity were committed in Nicaragua by police and pro-government groups during anti-government protests between April and September 2018. This was a period when Taiwan still had diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, and Commander in Chief of the Nicaraguan Army General Julio Cesar Aviles Castillo visited President Tsai in March 2018 (he was later sanctioned by the United States for his involvement in human rights abuses) and in 2018 Taiwan donated millions of dollars to (supposedly for medical aid) to Police Chief Francisco Diaz (who was already under United States sanctions). It’s unfortunate that Taiwan continued to support the Nicaragua government during this period.
This author often opines that Taiwan cannot achieve everything it wants in its foreign policy goals. In other words, other countries treat Taiwan as a normal country rather than a country that deserves special treatment. Periodically saying that Taiwan “stands with” another country under threat or that Taiwan has shared values of freedom and democracy with other countries is sometimes useful. Ultimately other countries will always put their own priorities first, and sometimes might take advantage of Taiwan. Recent events once again demonstrate this, and are a reminder that Taiwan’s security depends on its relations with the United States, and there’s limited value from foreign policy adventures.