方恩格專欄》澳洲議會通過挺臺決議之後

外交部。(資料照)

2024年8月21日星期三,澳大利亞參議院(澳洲國會上院)通過了一項跨黨派決議,批評中國試圖利用聯合國第2758號決議宣揚其對臺灣擁有主權的主張;該決議內容承認中華人民共和國爲中國在聯合國組織的「唯一合法代表」。

澳大利亞參議院的決議指出,聯合國第2758號決議「並未確立中華人民共和國對臺灣的主權,也未決定臺灣在聯合國的未來地位」。

此決議的短期目標是爲了促進臺灣實質參與聯合國相關組織,如世界衛生組織。

澳大利亞參議院的這項決議,緊隨7月30日在臺北召開的對中政策跨國議會聯盟(IPAC)年會,該會議通過了一項供世界各國議會使用的「範本」決議。這項決議範本是IPAC臺北峰會的亮點之一,吸引了來自23個國家的49名成員參加,而臺灣的外交部也隨即發佈了中英文的新聞稿,感謝IPAC提出有關聯合國第2758號決議的「範本」決議。

事實上,在IPAC峰會中,賴清德總統發表了一篇題爲「臺灣的全球願景」的演講,延續了前總統蔡英文始於第二任期的一項政策,即是將兩岸關係「國際化」;這一政策源於她在2019年競選連任期間,成功借鑑香港的局勢,並將其與臺灣的處境相提並論。

然而,兩岸關係國際化的策略並未能在2022年帶給民進黨地方選舉的勝利。此外,這也似乎未能幫助民進黨在2024年總統和立委選舉中取得優勢,因爲賴清德2024年總統大選的勝利主要源自於國民黨和民衆黨選票分裂,而民進黨也失去了立法院的多數席次。

另一個兩岸關係國際化的例子是,西方國家政府在高級官員或領導人會晤後所發表的聯合聲明中,經常會提到兩岸和平與穩定的重要性。外交部也會迅速感謝這些國家所發表的聲明,例如近日感謝澳洲和紐西蘭總理在8月中旬會晤後的聲明中提及臺海議題。

臺灣希望將自身情況國際化是可以理解的。如果有更多外國呼籲中國不要武力犯臺,這可能會促使中國重新考慮是否以軍事手段統一臺灣。兩岸關係國際化也會導致更多的外國政客訪臺,儘管中國對此並不樂見。在過去的一週,訪臺政客包括美國前駐聯合國常代、於共和黨總統大選中敗選的候選人—妮基·海莉以及日本前首相野田佳彥。海莉在臺北凱達格蘭論壇上發表演講,雖然可能有收演講費,但臺灣政府仍對她的訪問表示感謝。

在澳大利亞參議院通過其決議後,可能會發生以下幾件事情:

1. 更多議會通過類似決議:鑑於參加IPAC會議的成員國來自23個國家,這些議會成員國中的許多人很有可能會試圖說服自己國家的議會通過類似於澳大利亞參議院的決議。在一些國家,這可能只會發生在兩院制國會中的其中一院,而在其他國家,則可能出現在上議院和下議院之間。

2. 外交部的努力:臺灣的外交部及其駐世界各地的代表處都很可能會以澳大利亞參議院的例子作爲榜樣,並更努力地說服各國議會通過類似的決議。許多西方國家可能會照做。甚至日本也可能效法,因爲儘管多年以來有些人呼籲日本通過類似於美國《臺灣關係法》的法律,但至今尚未實現。

3. 臺灣將由衷感謝通過類似決議的國家:臺灣的外交部無疑會對通過此類決議的議會表示感謝。例如,澳大利亞參議院通過決議後,外交部第二天便發佈了新聞稿表示感謝。

4. 中國將怒不可遏:中國肯定會批評澳大利亞參議院以及任何其他通過此類決議的國家議會。中國還可能進行政治報復,如中斷雙邊對話,或是採取貿易報復措施,如近年來當立陶宛等國家對臺灣過度支持時所做的那樣。又或者,中國可能不會向通過決議的國家進行報復,而是會將矛頭轉向臺灣。

5. 美國國會可能通過類似決議:在這類決議的通過中,最重要的國家當然是美國了。事實上,類似措辭已出現在2023年美國聯邦衆議院外交委員會通過的一項友臺法案中。每年,美國國會通常都會通過一些友臺決議,或是在通過的法案中加入親臺言論。因此,如果這種情況再次發生,也不會令人感到驚訝,就連其中包含IPAC的範本決議言論也不足爲奇。

但後續會如何呢?如果川普在11月的總統大選中獲勝,並於2025年1月重返白宮,他很可能會再次將美國撤出世界衛生組織,並建立一個替代的全球性衛生組織,讓臺灣參與其中。反之,如果副總統賀錦麗贏得大選,她必定會繼續支持臺灣參與世界衛生組織;即使她的國務卿每年只會發表一次相關聲明,希望臺灣能夠實質參與世界衛生組織或其他聯合國相關組織。

最終,只要中國的政策是堅持臺灣政府接受「九二共識」作爲兩岸關係的基礎,臺灣實質參與聯合國相關組織的可能性就會降到極低,甚至爲零。

除非美國退出世界衛生組織,否則除了美國之外,沒有任何西方國家會因臺灣缺乏實質參與而抵制聯合國組織。雖然在外國議會通過有關中國不當使用聯合國第2758號決議解釋的決議時,臺灣想要加以慶祝的心態是可以理解的;但是事實究竟爲何,仍須銘記在心。

(作者爲美國共和黨前亞太區主席,許淳恩翻譯)

What Comes Next After Australia Senate Taiwan Resolution?

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad

X: @RossFeingold

On Wednesday August 21, Australia’s Senate (the upper house of the Australian Parliament) passed a bipartisan resolution criticizing China's attempts to use United Nations Resolution 2758 (which admitted the People's Republic of China to the United Nations as the "only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations") to advance China’s claim that it has sovereignty over Taiwan.

The Australia Senate resolution said that United Nations Resolution 2758 "does not establish the People's Republic of China's sovereignty over Taiwan and does not determine the future status of Taiwan in the UN".

The short term goal of such a resolution is to facilitate Taiwan’s substantive participation in United Nations affiliated organizations such as the World Health Organization.

The Australia Senate resolution follows on the recent meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (“IPAC”) in Taipei on July 30, which passed a “model” resolution for parliaments worldwide to use on this topic. The model resolution was one of the highlights of the IPAC summit in Taipei attended by forty nine members from twenty three countries, and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately issued a press release in English and Mandarin to thank IPAC for the proposed “model” about United Nations Resolution 2758.

In fact, at the IPAC summit President William Lai delivered a speech titled “Taiwan’s Global Vision”. These continues a policy begun during former President Tsai Ing-wen’s second term in office to “internationalize” cross-straits relations, which followed on her successful comparison of Taiwan to Hong Kong during her re-election campaign in 2019.

However, internationalizing Taiwan’s situation did not lead to electoral success for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2022 local election. It probably did not help the DPP in the 2024 presidential and legislative elections either, as William Lai’s victory in the 2024 presidential election arose from the split in the Chinese Nationalist Party and Taiwan People’s Party vote for president, and, the DPP lost its majority in the Legislative Yuan.

Another example of the internationalization of cross-straits relations is the frequent statements about the importance of cross-straits peace and stability that appears in joint statements western world governments issue after senior officials or leaders meet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also quick to thank such countries for these statements, such as in recent days a statement thanking the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand for their mention of the Taiwan Strait in a statement issued after they met in mid-August.

It is understandable that Taiwan wishes to internationalize its situation. If more foreign countries call on China not to use its military to force Taiwan’s surrender, it might make China reconsider an invasion as a method to bring about unification. Internationalizing Taiwan’s situation also results in more politicians from other countries visiting Taiwan, despite China’s anger about such visits. Just this past week visiting politicians included former United States Ambassador to the United Nations (and failed candidate in the Republican Party primary for president) Nikki Haley, and former Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko (野田 佳彥). It’s possible that Haley received a speaking fee to speak at the Ketagalan Forum in Taipei, but her visit is still appreciated by the government.

Several things are possible to occur after the Australia Senate passed its resolution:

1. More Parliaments Will Pass Similar Resolutions: Given that attendees at the IPAC meeting came from twenty three countries, it is very likely that many of these parliamentarians will try to persuade their own parliaments to pass a similar resolution to what the Australia Senate passed. In some countries this might occur only in one house of a bicameral parliament, while in other countries it might occur in both the upper house and the lower house.

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Efforts: Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its representative offices throughout the world, will likely cite the Australia Senate as an example to follow, and increase efforts to convince parliaments around the world to pass similar resolutions. Many western countries might do so. Perhaps even Japan will do so, even if for many years some have called on Japan to pass a law similar to the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act but this has not happened yet.

3. Taiwan Will Enthusiastically Thank Countries That Pass Similar Resolutions: Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs will of course thank the parliaments that pass such resolutions. The day after the Australia Senate passed its resolution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release to express its thanks.

4. China Will React Angrily: Certainly China will criticize the Australia Senate, and the parliament of any other country that passes such a resolution. China might also retaliate politically (such as by cutting off bilateral dialogues) or initiate trade retaliation as it has done in recent years when countries such as Lithuania became too supportive of Taiwan. Alternatively, rather than retaliate against the country whose parliament passed the resolution, China might retaliate against Taiwan.

5. The United States Congress Might Pass a Similar Resolution: The most important country to pass such a resolution will of course be the United States. In fact, similar wording was included in a proposed pro-Taiwan bill passed by a House committee in 2023. Every year, the United States Congress usually passes pro-Taiwan resolutions (or includes pro-Taiwan language in bills that are passed into law), so it will come as no surprise that it will happen again and might include the model IPAC language.

But what will happen afterwards? If Donald Trump wins this November’s presidential election and returns to the White House in January 2025, he will likely once again withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization and there will be hope that the United States creates an alternative global health organization that Taiwan will participate in. But if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the presidential election, she will certainly continue Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization, even if her Secretary of State will issue a statement once a year expressing hope that Taiwan can substantively participate in the World Health Organization or other United Nations affiliated organizations.

Ultimately, as long as China’s policy is to insist that the Taiwan government accept the “1992 Consensus” as the basis for cross-strait relations, the likelihood of Taiwan’s substantive participation in United Nations affiliated organizations is extremely low, or even non-existent.

None of the western countries (unless the United States withdraws from the World Health Organization) will boycott United Nations organizations over the issue of Taiwan’s lack of substantive participation. Although it is understandable that Taiwan wants to celebrate when a foreign parliament passes a resolution disputing China’s interpretation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, this reality must also be kept in mind.